Skip to content

Evaluation harness

laya.evals turns a labelled dataset into a repeatable score, and a baseline into a pass/fail gate, so a quality change is a reviewable diff instead of a hand-check.

The metric math and the dataset parser are pure Python plus numpy and never import torch, so they run with no weights. Running a dataset against a checkpoint needs the checkpoint and takes its normal load time.

Python runners need predict(state, questions). Direct Agents can be evaluated on their own checkpoint; an explicit per-example model requires a runner that accepts that keyword. Unsupported pins fail before prediction, including with on_error="skip".

Quickstart

# check the format without a model
laya-evals validate research/evals/fixture.jsonl

# score a labelled set on one checkpoint, with thresholds and a baseline
laya-evals run data.jsonl --model english --device cpu \
    --min-accuracy 0.8 --max-ece 0.05 --score-within 0.25 --slice language \
    --json report.json --markdown report.md

# compare a saved report to a baseline
laya-evals compare report.json --baseline baseline.json --tolerance choice_accuracy=0.02

laya eval ... is the same thing through the main CLI, so laya eval validate data.jsonl works too.

Exit codes: 0 on success, 1 when a threshold or a baseline tolerance fails, 2 on a usage error. run prints the overall metrics and any requested slices to stdout, and writes the full report and a Markdown summary when --json / --markdown are given.

Comparing a student with repeated teacher decisions

When a teacher gives different answers to the same input, a single saved answer does not describe its repeatability. compare_agreement compares a student and an independent teacher repeat against one fixed reference teacher observation. It takes three saved runs and needs no model weights or teacher service:

laya-evals agreement reference.json repeat.json student.json \
    --bootstrap-samples 2000 --seed 0 --json agreement.json

Without --json, the command writes the report to stdout. --seed controls only the bootstrap, not model generation. Success exits 0; malformed or misaligned runs exit 2. This command does not apply a replacement or quality gate.

Each input is a JSON object with the following shape:

{
  "schema": "laya-agreement-run/1",
  "run_id": "teacher-reference",
  "provenance": {
    "model": "teacher-checkpoint",
    "revision": null,
    "settings": {"temperature": 0.7, "prompt_template": "Choose one label."},
    "seed": 42
  },
  "cases": [{
    "id": "ticket-001",
    "state": "I was charged twice.",
    "questions": {"route": {
      "type": "choice",
      "instructions": "Select the team responsible for this request.",
      "criteria": ["billing", "support"]
    }},
    "answers": {"route": "billing"},
    "language": "en",
    "tags": ["duplicate-charge"]
  }]
}

Use a distinct run_id for each observation run. All three runs must contain exactly the same unique case IDs, states, question definitions, language and tags; row order may differ. A state must be non-null JSON. Question definitions preserve option order and accept non-empty criteria dictionaries or lists of distinct string labels. Answers must cover every question. A student answer may be null for abstention; teacher answers must be labels. Missing cases, unknown labels, non-finite JSON values and duplicate JSON object keys in CLI inputs are errors, rather than omitted samples.

The two teacher runs must declare identical model, revision and settings. Put sampling parameters and the prompt template in settings, and repetition seeds outside it. Other metadata, such as the dataset revision and generation script, is preserved. Record immutable model revisions when available; explicitly use null when unknown. The report flags unknown revisions but cannot verify that the recorded provenance is accurate or that the teacher calls were independent. Input object order is significant, matching Laya's serialization of structured states and questions; keep it identical across the runs.

To run a local student after validating the teacher records:

import json
import laya
from laya.evals import evaluate_agreement

with open("reference.json", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
    reference = json.load(handle)
with open("repeat.json", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
    repeat = json.load(handle)
revision = "YOUR_CHECKPOINT_COMMIT"
with laya.Router(device="cpu", revision=revision) as runner:
    report = evaluate_agreement(
        runner, reference, repeat, model="english",
        student_provenance={
            "model": "convaiinnovations/laya", "revision": revision,
            "settings": {"device": "cpu"},
        },
    )
print(report["overall"])

The runner uses the same predict(state, questions) protocol as the labelled harness. A supplied model requires keyword support (for example, laya.Router); a direct Agent uses its loaded checkpoint when no model is named. Language and tags are slice metadata; configure the runner's language policy and record it in student provenance. Inputs are copied before inference. Runner failures propagate; invalid or incomplete outputs raise EvalError. A choice flagged abstention="abstained" becomes a null observation, while its underlying choice must still be a valid label.

The separate laya-agreement-report/1 report records provenance, input hashes, individual paired decisions and rates sliced by question ID, language and tag. For every decision, teacher repeat agreement is repeat == reference, student agreement is student == reference, and the paired delta is their difference. All rates use the full decision count: abstentions contribute zero agreement and reduce student_coverage. The 95% percentile interval resamples whole case IDs, keeping their questions together, and recomputes the ratio of decision sums. It is deterministic for fixed inputs, seed and bootstrap count (100–100000). With fewer than two cases the interval is null. Slice rates have no intervals.

Agreement is not accuracy, and teacher repeatability is not a theoretical ceiling. Both models can agree on a wrong answer. The interval describes variation across the supplied cases with their saved observations; it does not capture additional teacher generations and assumes independent case IDs. Repeated or related inputs can invalidate it. An interval containing zero does not establish equivalence. Inspect slices and individual decisions for label skew, and use labelled evals for correctness or calibration claims.

examples/evals/teacher_agreement.py replays two published teacher observations from a pinned public dataset against a local Laya checkpoint, saving the three runs and their report. Its small fixed sample demonstrates the workflow, not deployment readiness.

Attributing shortlist errors

For a labelled high-cardinality choice set, laya.evals_shortlist.evaluate_shortlist uses the existing predict_shortlist path and the regular evaluation harness. It answers two separate questions: did retrieval keep the gold label, and did Laya choose it when it was present? This is an opt-in Python API for choice labels; ordinary laya-evals run reports are unchanged.

import laya
from laya.evals import Dataset
from laya.evals_shortlist import evaluate_shortlist
from laya.shortlist import embed_fn_from_agent

agent = laya.load()
dataset_path = "intents.jsonl"
dataset = Dataset.from_jsonl(dataset_path)
report = evaluate_shortlist(
    agent, dataset, embed_fn_from_agent(agent), k=20,
    checkpoint_id="my-checkpoint@revision", embedder_id="my-encoder@revision",
    dataset_path=dataset_path,
)
print(report.overall)
print(report.cases[0]["shortlist_status"])

Use the same embedding function and checkpoint as the deployment being measured. The two identifiers are supplied by the caller and should name immutable revisions; the report cannot infer the weights behind an arbitrary callable. dataset_path records the file's SHA256 alongside the existing question fingerprint. Each case keeps the actual shortlist labels and one of correct, retrieval_miss, or decision_miss. shortlist_recall_at_k is the fraction of gold labels retained. shortlist_accuracy_on_recalled is correct decisions divided by retained cases; it is omitted when none were retained. The existing choice_accuracy remains end-to-end accuracy over all cases, including retrieval misses. The shortlist metrics appear in the same language, model, question and tag slices. Request latency includes embedding and the decision call; the report does not isolate stage timings. With k >= n, the original question passes through and retrieval recall is 1 without calling the embedder.

This does not reproduce the BANKING77 results in Laya issue #102: those numbers depend on its dataset, checkpoint and bi-encoder. This API makes the same kind of diagnosis repeatable on a caller's own labelled set.

Evaluating an ONNX export

run --onnx PATH scores an exported ONNX model through ONNXAgent instead of the torch Router, so an ONNX deployment (including an INT8 copy from scripts/export_onnx.py --quantize) gets gated by the same thresholds and baselines as the torch path:

python scripts/export_onnx.py --model convaiinnovations/laya --output laya.onnx --quantize
laya-evals run data.jsonl --onnx laya.int8.onnx --max-ece 0.05

--model names the checkpoint the export came from — a Hub id or local path, not a Router short name like english, since there is no Router on this path (default convaiinnovations/laya). Its config and tokenizer are loaded from there. The agent serves one checkpoint, so a dataset row whose model field names a different one fails with a clear error rather than being silently answered by the wrong model; --device does not apply. --batch-size uses the agent's batch API when it has one and falls back to one call per state otherwise; --sort-by-length is forwarded to that batch API; the per-state fallback has no group to reorder. Pass --calibration PATH to load a fitted calibration map onto ONNXAgent, so calibration gates such as --max-ece evaluate against calibrated probabilities. The report's config block records the onnx path and calibration path (when set).

Measured on research/evals/fixture.jsonl (12 labelled rows, English checkpoint, CPU):

runner choice_acc noul_acc score_mae ece mean_conf p50 ms
torch Router 0.75 1.00 1.3418 0.1596 0.7304 116.8
--onnx fp32 0.75 1.00 1.3418 0.1596 0.7304 66.3
--onnx int8 0.75 1.00 1.3512 0.1658 0.7304 46.3

The fp32 export reproduces the torch numbers exactly, and the quantized copy moves score_mae by 0.009 and ece by 0.006 — the kind of drift compare --tolerance is meant to gate.

Dataset format

One JSON object per line (JSONL). Blank lines and lines starting with # are ignored.

field required meaning
state yes text, email, ticket or JSON document to decide on
questions yes a Laya question dict, exactly as Router.predict accepts
expected yes ground truth keyed by question id: a label for choice, a number for score, true/false for noul
tags no strings to slice by
language no a code to slice by
model no force a checkpoint for this row; --model overrides it. A row that forces nothing is labelled with whatever checkpoint the Router answered with

research/evals/dataset.template.jsonl has a commented example.

Metrics

Each metric is computed per answer where it applies and aggregated over the dataset:

metric applies to meaning
choice_accuracy choice fraction whose chosen label matches
noul_accuracy noul fraction whose boolean (probability >= 0.5) matches
score_mae score mean absolute error
score_within_<tol> score fraction within an absolute tolerance
ece any answer with a confidence expected calibration error, 15 bins, computed on the column laya.evals._answer_confidence reads -- answer["answer_confidence"] where the answer carries it, and a fallback where it does not; see which confidence a metric reads
brier any answer with a confidence and a known label Brier score of confidence as P(correct), mean((confidence - correct)**2); lower is better
aurc any answer with a confidence and a known label area under the risk--coverage curve: one risk value per distinct confidence level, each weighted by the answers that level spans; lower is better, and rewards a confidence that ranks right from wrong rather than just being calibrated
selective_accuracy@50, selective_accuracy@80 any answer with a confidence and a known label accuracy over the answers a confidence threshold at the 50% / 80% coverage point accepts -- what abstaining on the least-confident tail buys. A threshold cannot split a group of equal confidences, so this can cover more than the named fraction; see coverage cuts
mean_confidence any answer with a confidence mean of the same column -- answer["answer_confidence"] where the answer carries it
latency_p50_ms, latency_p95_ms per request wall time each request waited, informational -- see batching
cost_per_decision_p50_ms, cost_per_decision_p95_ms per decision a call's wall time divided by the rows it carried, informational

Which confidence a metric reads

Every row above that takes a confidence (ece, brier, aurc, both selective_accuracy@*, mean_confidence) gets its column from laya.evals._answer_confidence, which prefers answer["answer_confidence"] -- the probability of the answer being reported, the quantity temperature scaling fits. It is not a claim that the number is right as shipped: both base checkpoints are over-confident and laya-multilingual ships no fitted temperatures at all -- see Calibration -- which is what ece measures rather than assumes.

An answer that carries no answer_confidence falls through, in order, to confidence, then max(p, 1 - p) for a noul, then max(probabilities). Those are different quantities. On choice and score the confidence field is normalized entropy, which moves with the option count (#394) rather than with how right the answer is; max(probabilities) is the mass on the top option, equal to the reported answer's probability only when the reported answer is the argmax.

The shape that actually arrives without the field is the strict Jev wire contract: LAYA_JEV_STRICT drops answer_confidence from every answer (laya/serve.py::_project_jev_strict, and the flag's row in the HTTP API page), so a report run over recorded strict responses calibrates the entropy number. Measured on three labelled rows -- choice carrying answer_confidence 0.95 against an entropy confidence of 0.7887, score 0.90 against 0.6410, noul 0.87 -- the same dataset scores mean_confidence 0.9067 and ece 0.0900 over the full payloads and 0.7666 and 0.1707 over the strict projection. Two reports are comparable only when their answers carry the same field; tests/test_evals.py pins both paths so a change to that fallback order has to be made deliberately.

Coverage cuts and ties

Both coverage metrics cut on a confidence threshold, and a threshold accepts every answer at its own confidence. So a cut never splits a group of answers that share one: when coverage * n falls inside such a group, every member of the group is accepted. The number of answers behind the figure is therefore the group's upper edge rather than the named fraction -- selective_accuracy@50 over a slice whose confidences are all equal is that slice's own accuracy, not the better half of it. The count the gate prints (n= in a rule's failure message) is the slice's size, not the accepted size, so a very wide group is not visible from the message alone.

Ties are the normal case rather than a corner: a fitted temperature can leave a bucket reporting a point mass, which laya.common.answer_confidence records of the shipped choice:11+, and a real checkpoint produced a six-row group at exactly 1.0 out of twelve answers. Cutting at a row index instead made both metrics depend on the order the dataset arrived in -- the same rows, shuffled, moved selective_accuracy@50 between 0.000 and 1.000.

aurc integrates one risk value per distinct level, weighted by the answers that level spans, so it remains an area under the risk--coverage curve rather than an average of unevenly sized points.

Two consequences worth planning for:

  • A number can move in either direction, by more than a reordering could. Where a group straddles the cut, the threshold reading differs from every row-index reading of the same data: measured over 400,001 tie-shaped datasets, up to 0.500 for selective_accuracy@50 and 0.351 for aurc. On the twelve-answer shape above -- six correct, all at confidence 1.0 -- aurc moves 0.327 (0.173 to 0.500). A gate that was passing may fail, and one that was failing may pass; the previous verdict depended on row order, including for an absolute min or max limit, which is refused by nothing because it reads a single run.
  • Regenerate committed baselines. config.coverage_metric_definition records which definition produced a report. Comparing a coverage metric across two definitions is refused on both the gates that subtract a baseline -- --baseline --tolerance (EvalReport.compare) and a relative rule (max_drop / max_increase) under --gate-policy -- and on either side being stale, not just the baseline: a candidate produced by an older laya carries a row-order artifact that can read better than the truth, so gating it against a correctly regenerated baseline would pass a regression that the correctly scored report fails. Without that refusal a stale baseline hides a real regression: a slice recorded at 0.033 under the old definition reads 0.517 under this one, so a candidate that genuinely dropped 0.217 would clear a max_drop of 0.05. ece and brier do not cut and stay comparable.

With no ties in the data there is one level per answer, and both metrics are exactly what they have always been -- bit-identical, not merely close.

Add ScoreWithin(0.25) to the evaluator list for a tolerance metric; the default set is choice_accuracy, noul_accuracy, score_mae, mean_confidence, plus ece. From the CLI the same thing is one flag: laya-evals run data.jsonl --score-within 0.25 reports score_within_0.25 beside the defaults, and the flag repeats, so --score-within 0.25 --score-within 0.5 reports both.

A tolerance metric needs a score answer with a numeric label, so on a dataset without one it has no value: run names the metric it could not compute instead of publishing a silent zero, and a --min / --max gate naming that metric fails as missing. The tolerances a run was asked for are recorded in the report's config block, so a reviewed baseline says which columns it expects.

Batching and timing

--batch-size N scores up to N consecutive rows that share a checkpoint and a question schema in one call. Both timing metrics come from the same measurements and answer different questions: every row of a batch returns when the batch does, so its latency is the whole call, while its cost_per_decision is 1/N of it. Batching therefore raises latency_* and lowers cost_per_decision_* on an unchanged set of decisions, and --max latency_p50_ms=... asks whether requests were served fast, not whether the run was cheap. With no --batch-size the two agree.

compare ignores any *_ms metric unless a tolerance names it, so these never fail a baseline on timing noise. What the harness actually did -- the batch size asked for, the runner shape it resolved to, how many rows shared a call, and the largest chunk -- is recorded in the report's config.timing, because the flag alone does not say whether anything was batched. Those counters record the calls issued, not the calls that returned: with laya-evals run --on-error skip, a chunk whose call raised still counts in rows_grouped and max_chunk, next to its entries in config.errored. The default is --on-error fail, which re-raises instead of publishing a report whose metrics cover only the calls that came back. The two *_ms metrics count only the calls that returned, so a failed call never contributes a latency it did not measure.

Grouping the rows inside a batch

--sort-by-length groups similarly sized rows into the same forward pass, so each pass pads to a shorter maximum instead of to the longest row in it. It is the shape of the calls, not their answers: results come back in the same order and score identically, which is why research/ can report 2.15x over 10,000 tickets with no decision changing.

There has to be more than one pass to reorder, so it takes effect only with a --batch-size N below the number of rows the run groups. config.timing keeps the two claims apart: sort_by_length is what the command line said, sort_by_length_sent is what reached the runner. A run with no --batch-size asks for something that cannot happen, and says so with sent: false; a runner whose predict_batch predates the knob is scored unsorted rather than raising TypeError halfway through a long run.

The abstention gate at a threshold

--min-confidence T forwards core's opt-in abstention threshold (#361) to every call the run makes, so Router and ONNXAgent mark answers whose answer_confidence falls below T with low_confidence: True and abstention: "abstained" before the harness sees them. The gate is a reporting control, not a scoring one: apply_confidence_gate leaves answer["choice"] / ["noul"] / ["score"] as the raw argmax and _aggregate reads only those keys, so every accuracy, calibration and coverage number -- ece, brier, aurc, selective_accuracy@NN -- is the same at T=0 and T=0.7. What changes is the report's config.timing.min_confidence and config.timing.min_confidence_sent, and any caller who acts on the flag downstream of the harness.

The accepted range is core's laya.confidence.check_min_confidence -- [0.0, 1.0], finite, not a bool -- rather than a copy here, so a value the gate itself would reject fails as a usage error (exit 2) before any checkpoint loads. 0.0 is a legal ask: it is the control arm for an abstention sweep and the threshold at which flag_low_confidence marks no answer, so a check that dropped it would hide which arm actually ran.

A runner whose predict or (for a batched run) whose predict_batch predates the gate is refused with a named EvalError, not run without the threshold. Silently dropping it would let report.config["timing"]["min_confidence"] name a threshold the harness never applied -- the class of lie this harness exists to prevent, even though the metric numbers stay identical. config.timing records both the ask and the fact: min_confidence is the threshold that was requested, min_confidence_sent says whether any call this run made actually carried it.

Slices

compare and run report overall numbers and, for --slice language|model|qid|tag, the same metrics per slice value, so a regression in one language or one question is visible without reading the aggregate. The model slice holds the checkpoint that answered each row: the Router's own choice per request, or the runner's model for a runner that does not route.

Opt-in slice gates

The overall baseline gate can pass while a smaller language or question slice regresses. To make one reviewed slice a CI requirement, save a JSON policy such as gates.json:

{
  "version": 1,
  "rules": [
    {"slice": {"language": "zh"}, "metric": "choice_accuracy",
     "min_count": 50, "max_drop": 0.05},
    {"slice": {"qid": "intent"}, "metric": "ece",
     "min_count": 50, "max": 0.10}
  ]
}
laya-evals run data.jsonl --baseline baseline.json --tolerance choice_accuracy=0.02 \
    --gate-policy gates.json --json report.json
laya-evals compare report.json --baseline baseline.json \
    --tolerance choice_accuracy=0.02 --gate-policy gates.json

Each rule selects exactly one language, model, qid, or tag value and names the metric exactly as it appears in the slice report. It has a positive min_count and exactly one limit: min or max checks the candidate value; max_drop permits at most that decrease from the baseline; max_increase permits at most that increase. The latter two require --baseline. The count is the number of scored answers for that metric in the selected slice, in both reports for a relative rule. For ece, it is the number of answers with a finite confidence and boolean correct value. A missing slice or metric, too few scored answers, or skipped/errored cases fails the opted-in gate. Relative rules also require both reports to carry matching run identities, so missing evidence cannot appear as a pass. A measured regression reports the slice, metric, counts, values, and limit. Invalid policy syntax exits 2 before a checkpoint loads; a quality failure exits 1. The policy is recorded in config.gate_policy of a run --json report. compare --gate-policy applies the policy supplied on that command line to the saved measurements. If it differs from the report's recorded policy, compare says so; an explicit re-check under a new policy does not change the policy under which the original run was made.

The regular overall comparison still applies, including its tolerance and legacy-baseline behavior. Without --gate-policy, slice reporting and comparison behave as before.

Run identity

run records what it measured in the report's config block, so the artifact a reviewer reads is reviewable on its own:

key meaning
schema the report shape, laya-evals-report/1, so a consumer can refuse one it cannot read
dataset the path as typed -- a name, not a hash
dataset_sha256 the sha256 of the dataset bytes that were parsed
questions_sha256 a fingerprint of the question schema: every question's id, type, instructions and criteria, over the whole dataset
laya_version the laya that computed the numbers
coverage_metric_definition which definition of aurc / selective_accuracy@* produced this report (see coverage cuts). A relative gate rule on either refuses a baseline recorded under a different one, rather than subtracting numbers that do not mean the same thing
thresholds the gate this run applied: min, max and baseline_tolerance
gate_policy the optional slice gate policy applied by run --gate-policy
revisions a torch run records the commit for each loaded checkpoint; an --onnx run records its config/tokenizer source under the --model key. Local directories have null revisions (see below)

dataset is a path, and a path is not an identity: a dataset can be edited in place, moved, or refetched under the same name, and a CI cache can hand two runs the same filename and different bytes. questions_sha256 covers what was asked rather than how many rows there were, so adding states to an unchanged question set leaves the fingerprint alone -- dataset_sha256 still moves, and adding a row is a change to the data, not to the question.

It covers instructions too, because the instruction text is the prompt. build_sequence renders "<type> question: <instructions>" into the tokenized head, Agent refuses a question without one ("add the text the model should answer"), and Laya's own question identity already counts it: Router._question_schema and this harness's batch grouping both key on the whole questions dict, and tests/test_router_batch.py pins that rewording instructions alone moves a row into its own batch group. So does a reworded instruction still compare equal to a baseline? No -- and that is the point. "Judge whether a refund is justified" and "Be conservative and only approve explicit refund requests" ask different questions, and the metric gate can only notice when the difference happens to move a number further than the tolerance you named. Naming a choice option is the same argument: criteria is the decision space, and the metamorphic checks in research/eval/metamorphic.py exist because renaming a label flips answers.

Nothing about the instruction text is normalized except the one step the engine itself applies: a non-string instructions is hashed as json.dumps(ins, ensure_ascii=False), matching Agent._to_internal. So whitespace and wording both count, and a rewording that a human considers a copy edit is treated as a new experiment. That is the honest default -- the alternative is a similarity heuristic standing between a run and its baseline, and no evaluation system in common use has one.

Nothing time-bearing is recorded, so a report is still byte-reproducible for a fixed runner.

REPORT_SCHEMA, questions_fingerprint(dataset) and file_fingerprint(path) are public, so a caller driving laya.evals.evaluate directly gets the same identity a CLI run does.

Baseline and CI gate

  • Keep the dataset, a baseline report (--json output you have reviewed), and the tolerances together, committed, so a change is a reviewable diff. --tolerance METRIC=VALUE is the maximum absolute drift allowed for that metric.
  • laya-evals run ... --baseline baseline.json --tolerance ... exits non-zero on drift, so it drops into CI unchanged. laya.evals.EvalReport.compare and assert_regression expose the same logic for tests.

The metric gate answers "did the numbers move". It cannot answer "were these the same numbers", because compare reads overall and only overall -- so a baseline recorded against one dataset would pass a candidate scored on another, with identical arithmetic. EvalReport.comparable_to closes that: it compares schema, dataset_sha256 and questions_sha256, and run --baseline and compare still print every delta, then fail with a non-zero exit naming the key and both values:

FAIL: baseline is not comparable: dataset_sha256 (dataset bytes): baseline is <sha>, this run is <sha>

A key missing on either side is unknown, not a conflict, so every report written before the identity existed keeps comparing exactly as it did. That includes the scheduled gate's baseline below, which comes from research/eval/ and has no config.schema at all.

Two CI surfaces use this:

  • a weight-free job in .github/workflows/ci.yml runs tests/test_evals.py and tests/test_evals_api.py, so metric math, dataset parsing and the CLI are covered on every PR without downloading a checkpoint;
  • .github/workflows/evals.yml runs weekly, before a release and on demand: it evaluates the English checkpoint on the MASSIVE English suite and compares to research/results/eval_english_51_languages.json with the tolerances in research/evals/thresholds.json. It uploads the report as an artifact and does not block a PR.

The harness is deterministic for a fixed checkpoint revision, so a report is reproducible. run records the dataset, model and device, plus the timing facts of the run, in the report's config block, and revisions: the commit each checkpoint that answered was actually loaded from. --revision <SHA> pins that commit for every checkpoint the run loads, and --revision english=<SHA> pins one checkpoint (repeatable) — which is the form an auto-routing run wants, since the three checkpoints are three repositories and one commit cannot exist in all of them. Left unpinned, the run takes the checkpoint's default branch and the report still says which commit answered, so a baseline drift can be attributed to the weights or to the code. laya/revisions.py publishes reviewed commit SHAs in PINNED_REVISIONS for callers who want to opt in. With --onnx, only a bare --revision <SHA> applies, to the config and tokenizer download.

Both routes write the revisions block. Without --model, the ONNX source key defaults to convaiinnovations/laya while config.model stays null. This source revision does not verify the exported graph's weights: record the graph's checksum separately when attributing a result to an export. A source given as a local directory is recorded as null.

Adding the real labelled set

Drop a JSONL in research/evals/ and a reviewed baseline beside it, then point a workflow (or research/evals/check_regression.py) at both. The format is the same as the fixture; nothing in the harness knows about MASSIVE.

Evidence inspection

evidence reads — never writes — the artifacts a fine-tune/eval run already persists and says what evidence exists, what is missing, and what is insufficient. It loads no model weights and does not require torch.

laya-evals evidence --checkpoint ./my-checkpoint [--report report.json]

A checkpoint directory must contain rl_agent_config.json. Calibration evidence is derived from the persisted training.laya_train_calibration block: a legacy checkpoint with no training metadata is UNKNOWN; a question type with zero items is MISSING; a type whose entry records any upstream issues text (not fitted, below MIN_TYPE_N/CALIB_WARN_N, clamped, unchanged fit) is INSUFFICIENT; a clean fit is PRESENT. The helper trusts the persisted issues written by #933 instead of keeping a second numeric threshold source.

The eval report's identity fields (schema, dataset_sha256, questions_sha256, laya_version) are reported with the same semantics as run. The checkpoint↔report relationship is claimed only as a deterministic conflict: if both artifacts expose the same dataset_sha256/questions_sha256 with different values, it is INCOMPARABLE. Everything else is UNKNOWN — matching laya_version alone never proves a match, and differing laya_version alone never proves a conflict.